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I. INTRODUCTION
After an air ambulance transported Ivan Mitchell’s wife from
Grand Forks, North Dakota to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester,
Minnesota, Mr. Mitchell received a bill for about $54,000.1 The
total bill was $67,325, but the Mitchells’ insurance only covered
approximately $9,000, leaving the Mitchells on the hook for the
balance.2 After a cluster of cases like the Mitchells’ experience,
the North Dakota state legislature attempted to regulate the air
ambulance industry in an effort to help its citizens afford neces-
sary medical care in times of crisis.3 The North Dakota legisla-
ture passed House Bill 1255,4 requiring providers of air
ambulance services “to become participating providers with cer-
tain North Dakota health insurance companies in order to be
listed on a ‘primary call list’ for air ambulance services.”5 A par-
ticipating provider would agree to charge only what is allowed in
insurance contracts, which would leave patients responsible only
for deductibles and any copayments that their policies require.6
The intent behind House Bill 1255 was to “prevent patients
from getting hit with exorbitant bills from out-of-network7 am-
bulance services.”8
1 Patrick Springer, N.D. Law Test Case for Preventing Air Ambulance Price ‘Goug-





4 H.B. 1255, 64th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2015) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 23-27-04.10 (West 2016)).
5 Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934 (D.N.D. 2016).
6 See Springer, supra note 1.
7 “Out-of-network” versus “in-network” is discussed infra Part V., Section B.2.
8 See Springer, supra note 1.
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Like air ambulance providers across the United States, Valley
Med Flight, Inc. (Valley Med), an air ambulance provider in
North Dakota, is an “air carrier” under the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (ADA).9 Valley Med filed suit against Terry Dwelle,
the State Health Officer for the North Dakota Department of
Health, to prevent enforcement of House Bill 1255.10 Judge
Hovland of the United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota granted Valley Med’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, holding:
The clear intent of the legislation is to prevent air ambulance
service providers, who are not participating providers, from im-
posing exorbitant fees on patients who wrongly assume their in-
surance will cover the charges and are not in a position to
discover otherwise. This type of consumer protection law is pre-
cisely the type of law Congress sought to preempt when it en-
acted the ADA.11
Judge Hovland based his decision on House Bill 1255’s effect on
the prices Valley Med could charge for its services, which cre-
ated a conflict with the ADA.12 The ADA reads that “a State . . .
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation.”13
The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the broad scope of the
ADA preemption clause, noting that “the key phrase ‘related to’
expresses a ‘broad pre-emptive purpose.’”14 That broad preemp-
tion means that “state laws and regulations ‘having a connection
with or reference to airline rates, routes, or services, are pre-
empted by the ADA.’”15 Cases like Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle
and experiences similar to that of Ivan Mitchell showcase the
precarious position that medical patients can be left in when
they require an air ambulance in order to get the treatment they
deserve, and their state lawmakers are unable to do anything
about it.
While preemption of state law is an oft-discussed topic, little
has been written about the specific preemption of air ambu-
9 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 934.
10 See id.
11 Id. at 942.
12 See id. at 941–42.
13 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
14 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1424 (2014) (quoting Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).
15 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 939 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 383).
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lance regulations under the ADA. Most articles highlight per-
sonal experiences of patients transported by air ambulances,
with just a passing mention of the ADA or state attempts to regu-
late the industry. There have also been other articles that discuss
pending cases, written before those cases were adjudicated by
the courts. One article discusses service preemption under the
ADA with respect to food allergies on flights.16 While this discus-
sion has similar underlying themes with the allergy preemption
article, the focuses are different and distinguished enough to
provide ample room for comment.
This article discusses the ins and outs of the air ambulance
industry, explains the status of air ambulance industry regula-
tory laws, and details why, in light of judicial precedent and in-
dustry practices, Congress should exempt air ambulances from
being classified as “carriers” under the ADA, so that state at-
tempts to regulate the air ambulance industry for the protection
of their citizens are no longer preempted by a law aimed to pro-
mote commercial competition. Part II traces the development of
the air ambulance industry from its wartime start to the present
day. Part III discusses briefly the different ways in which an air
ambulance provider receives payment for its services, as a means
of providing background for the impetus behind the state at-
tempts discussed in Part IV. Part IV lays out the legal framework
for ADA preemption based on Supreme Court precedent and
developments in lower courts related to attempts by states to cir-
cumvent the ADA. Part V explains why, given legislative intent,
industry practices, and judicial precedent, exempting air ambu-
lances from the ADA is the logical move.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR AMBULANCE INDUSTRY
The carnage that accompanied World War I brought with it a
new innovation: the first instance of an aircraft transporting
medical patients when “an open cockpit biplane was used to res-
cue injured soldiers and bring them to field hospitals.”17 Fast
forward nearly sixty years, and the first non-military dedicated
air ambulances began flying across the skies.18 An “air ambu-
16 See Laci Verdusco Resendiz, Comment, Food Allergies on Flights–How A Narrow
Interpretation of “Service” Preemption Under the Airline Deregulation Act Could Give Aller-
gic Passengers Much Needed Protection, 81 J. AIR L. & COM. 321 (2016).
17 Todd Lovshin, Air Ambulance Providers: Providers’ Refusal to Contract with Insur-
ers Costing Many Montanans Thousands, 41 MONT. LAWYER 32 (2016).
18 See id. (stating that “[i]n 1973 the first civil airplanes dedicated to emergency
medical services began operations”).
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lance” is exactly what it sounds like: helicopters or planes that
transport patients (and in some cases, donated organs) to and
from the hospital or scene of an accident.19 Air ambulances are
more than just aircraft designated specifically for transporting
medical patients; they are also “equipped with state-of-the-art
medical equipment and staffed by paramedics, emergency medi-
cal technicians and sometimes doctors and nurses.”20 This
equipment allows air ambulances to effectively transport “pa-
tients with time critical injuries and conditions to medical facili-
ties” as well as “provid[e] patients with advanced care while en
route.”21 The advanced technology and qualified medical per-
sonnel onboard the ambulances has led to the widely-held belief
that air ambulances “improve the chances of survival for trauma
victims and other critical patients,”22 such as those with “preg-
nancy complications, heart attacks, strokes and respiratory dis-
eases.”23 As of 2014, more than 550,000 patients per year are
transported via air ambulances,24 a number that has grown over
the years.25 The increasing usage of air ambulances has pushed
the regulation issue to the forefront and necessitates action.
III. PAYING FOR AIR AMBULANCE SERVICES IS
COMPLICATED
By their nature, medical services are expensive, and paying for
them can be complicated and involve multiple sources. The av-
erage distance covered by an air ambulance trip is fifty-two
miles, and will cost between $12,000 to $25,000 per flight,
before insurance kicks in.26 Air ambulance providers garner pay-
19 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-627T, AVIATION SAFETY: POTEN-
TIAL STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS AIR AMBULANCE SAFETY CONCERNS 1 (2009).
20 Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS.
COMM’RS (Apr. 2., 2014), http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_alert_
understanding_air_ambulance_insurance.htm [https://perma.cc/DR3K-PXK5].
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-907, AIR AMBULANCE: EFFECTS
OF INDUSTRY CHANGES ON SERVICES ARE UNCLEAR 3 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-
907].
22 Id.
23 Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20.
24 Id.
25 See GAO-10-907, at 3 (stating that “[a]ir ambulances transported more than
270,000 patients in 2008”).
26 DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Information Sheet: Understanding Coverage for
Air Ambulance Services, MICH. DEP’T INS. & FIN. SERVS. (July 2015), https://
www.michigan.gov/documents/difs/Air_Ambulance_Insurance_482626_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KHF5-JGVX]; see also Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambu-
lance Insurance, supra note 20.
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ment for their services in several ways, including, among others,
Medicare, private health insurance, and the patient himself.27
“Medicare is the principal government program that helps
pay for healthcare furnished by nongovernment providers.”28
There are a number of ways that an individual can qualify for
Medicare coverage. A person can “automatically qualify for
Medicare Part A” upon reaching the age of sixty-five.29 Those
who qualify for Part A coverage “are automatically enrolled in
Part B when they become eligible for Part A unless they opt
out.”30 Some individuals who do not qualify for Medicare cover-
age on their own have the ability to purchase coverage.31 Addi-
tionally, some “state Medicaid programs . . . buy Medicare
coverage for low-income individuals . . . .”32Ambulance services,
if covered, fall under Medicare Part B.33
Medicare may cover transportation by air ambulance if the pa-
tient’s condition necessitates ambulance transport that cannot
be accommodated by ground ambulance and one of the follow-
ing conditions applies: either (1) ground transport cannot easily
reach the patient’s pickup location; or (2) distance or obstacles
could interfere with ground transportation efforts and prevent
the patient from getting care quickly.34 Transport by air ambu-
lance is also “limited to taking the patient to the nearest appro-
priate facility.”35 While not listed explicitly under the details of
air ambulance coverage, the Medicare website does include a
caveat to the section on “emergency ambulance transporta-
tion”—“Medicare coverage depends on the seriousness of your
medical condition and whether you could’ve been safely trans-
ported by other means.”36 This caveat serves as a yellow flag for
Medicare patients, as the website does not state explicitly that
Medicare will “pay for emergency ambulance transportation in
27 See GAO-10-907, at 5 fig.1 (reproduced infra Figure 1).
28 TERRY S. COLEMAN, MEDICARE LAW 1 (2001).
29 See id. at 2 (“Individuals age sixty-five or over who qualify for Social Security
or Railroad Retirement monthly cash retirement benefits automatically qualify
for Medicare Part A.”).
30 Id. at 3.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 4.
33 See id. at 20 (“§ 2:2 The Part B Benefits Package”), 34 (“§ 2:2(f)(1)
Ambulance”).
34 See U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Your Medicare Coverage,
Ambulance Services, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/ambulance-services.html
[https://perma.cc/6VH8-JLXB] (last visited July 7, 2017).
35 COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 35.
36 Your Medicare Coverage, Ambulance Services, supra note 34.
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an airplane or helicopter,” but rather that “Medicare may pay for
emergency ambulance transportation in an airplane or helicop-
ter . . . .”37 That small difference in wording, combined with the
caveat, will force patients in critical situations to utilize whatever
forms of emergency medical transport they can get, and hope
that Medicare will provide coverage. Nevertheless, patients ulti-
mately will not know for sure if they are covered until after the
fact.
For those who are not enrolled in Medicare, their use of air
ambulances may be covered in whole or in part by their private
insurance, and if they do not have applicable insurance, the en-
tire cost will come out-of-pocket.38 “Balance billing” is when a
provider of medical services bills the patient for the “difference
between the provider’s charges and the amount” covered by in-
surance, or covered by an organization’s fee schedule.39 “For ex-
ample, if the provider’s charge is $100 and the allowed amount
is $70, the provider may bill [the patient] for the remaining
$30.”40
Figure 1, below, illustrates the many sources from which air
ambulance providers collect payment in order to satisfy a pa-
tient’s bill.
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 See Steve Jordon, Few Think About Insurance When Air Ambulance Lifts Off; Then
. . . Surprise, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.omaha.com/
money/few-think-about-insurance-when-air-ambulance-lifts-off-then/article_1175
9ecf-182f-59a2-8cde-7c804ecf9913.html [https://perma.cc/CX4B-ACJG] (Ne-
braska’s insurance director saying that some individuals “have found that there’s
a huge balance to pay even after their health insurance pays.”).
39 Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 937 (D.N.D. 2016); see
also Balance Billing, HEALTHCARE.GOV GLOSSARY, https://www.healthcare.gov/glos
sary/balance-billing/ [https://perma.cc/HB3X-GQJZ] (last visited July 7, 2017).
40 Balance Billing, supra note 39.
438 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
Figure 1: Percentage of Payments for Air Ambulance
Transports Received from Different Sources41
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Figure 1 shows the percentage of payment received by four air
ambulance providers from each of four sources: private insur-
ance, Medicare, Medicaid, and from the patient himself (which
would be the amount that was “balance billed” after the other
sources made their contributions). Figure 1 shows the unique
nature of each air ambulance transport, and how each source of
payment does not necessarily contribute the same amount or
percentage in every patient’s case.
IV. WHAT IS THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT?
As Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle illustrates, states at first
glance appear to have little to no options for regulating42 the
41 GAO-10-907, at 5 fig.1.
42 For purposes of this discussion, unless otherwise noted, any mention of reg-
ulating the air ambulance industry refers to regulating the prices and rates associ-
ated with air ambulance services, as states are free to regulate other aspects of the
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costs associated with the air ambulance industry on their own
due to the ADA.43 As the following sections discuss, state regula-
tion of air ambulance costs unfortunately appears to be nearly
impossible at this time. There may be a glimmer of hope for
states wanting to do something to help their citizens, but it is not
without its own potential legal hurdles to conquer when the
time comes.44
A. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE ADA EXPRESSLY PREEMPT
STATE REGULATION OF THE AIR AMBULANCE INDUSTRY,
BECAUSE AIR AMBULANCES ARE “CARRIERS”
Preemption of state law is possible because of the Supremacy
Clause,45 which “invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are
contrary to, federal law.”46 In 1978, Congress came to the con-
clusion that “deregulation of the airline industry would lead to
greater reliance on market forces resulting in greater efficiency,
innovation, lower prices, and enhanced quality and variety of air
transportation services,” and passed the ADA.47 The ADA dic-
tates that “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air trans-
portation.”48 The ADA therefore has an express preemption
clause, meaning that Congress has explicitly stated that the ADA
preempts state law.49
Specifically, the ADA is concerned with “air carrier[s].”50
While the ADA is silent as what constitutes an “air carrier,”51 Ti-
tle 49 defines the term as “a citizen of the United States under-
taking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air
transportation.”52 “As a general rule an air carrier is a common
carrier . . . .”53 Title 49 supports this statement, referencing “air-
industry. See GAO-10-907, at 23, 37; Lovshin, supra note 17, at 34 (“states do have
limited regulatory authority over air ambulance providers around medical and
quality standards of care”).
43 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 941–42.
44 See infra Part V., Section B.3.
45 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
46 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (internal quotations omitted).
47 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).
48 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
49 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 938.
50 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
51 See id.
52 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2012).
53 THOMAS A. DICKERSON, TRAVEL LAW § 2.05 (2016).
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craft [acting] as a common carrier for compensation.”54 While
that statute does not define the term, “it has been said that a
common carrier . . . holds [itself] out to the public as engaged
in the business of transporting persons or property from place
to place, for compensation, offering [its] services to the public
generally.”55 “The public, however, does not mean everybody all
the time.”56 It is irrelevant whether the entire population will
utilize the service, or whether it is a specialized service like air
ambulances.57 Therefore, air ambulances are considered to be
carriers under federal legislation.58
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on how the ADA’s
express preemption clause should be construed in three cases.59
The Supreme Court first took up the issue of the scope of ADA
preemption in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.60 In Morales,
the Supreme Court explained that the broad applicability of the
ADA’s preemption language prevents states from enforcing leg-
islation “relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
. . . .”61 The Court found that the key words “relating to” have a
broad plain language meaning, which in turn gives rise to “a
broad pre-emptive purpose.”62 The Court rejected the argument
that the ADA only preempts state laws that “actually prescrib[e]
rates, routes, or services” because such an interpretation would
have the effect of eliminating the words “relating to” from the
ADA.63 That effect would go against the Court’s own rules of
54 See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25).
55 D. E. Buckner, Annotation, Air Carrier as Common or Private Carrier, and Result-
ing Duties as to Passenger’s Safety, 73 A.L.R. 2d 346 (1960) (internal quotations
omitted).
56 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (quot-
ing Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 255 (1916)) (internal citations
omitted).
57 See id.
58 See id. at 732; Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 933
(D.N.D. 2016).
59 See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014); Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374
(1992).
60 Morales, 504 U.S. 374.
61 Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 385.
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construction.64 The Court expressed its findings simply: “State
enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to
airline rates, routes, or services are pre-empted” by the ADA.65
The Supreme Court next considered the scope of ADA pre-
emption in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.66 The statute at issue
in Wolens, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act,
declare[d] unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to
the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppres-
sion or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely
upon [it] . . . in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . .
whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or dam-
aged thereby.”67
The Court found that Illinois’ Consumer Fraud Act was “pre-
scriptive; it controls the primary conduct of those falling within
its governance” and “serves as a means to guide and police the
marketing practices of the airlines . . . .”68 The Court held that
the ADA preempted claims under the Consumer Fraud Act be-
cause the purpose behind the ADA was to “to leave largely to the
airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and
design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing
of air transportation services . . . .”69 The Court agreed with
American Airlines that “Congress could hardly have intended to
allow the States to hobble [competition for airline passengers]
through the application of restrictive state laws,”70 when promo-
tion of “competitive market forces” underlies the ADA itself.71 A
stable and efficient market depends on enforcing freedom of
contract ideals, a reality that “is key to sensible construction of
the ADA.”72
64 Id. at 383 (“The question . . . is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly
begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordi-
nary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (in-
ternal quotations omitted)).
65 Id. at 384 (internal quotations omitted).
66 513 U.S. 219, 221–22 (1995).
67 Id. at 227 (citing ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 815, § 505/2(1992) (formerly codi-
fied at ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, 262 (1991)).
68 Id. at 227–28.
69 Id. at 228.
70 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 27, Wolens, 513
U.S. 219 (No. 93-1286)).
71 Id. at 230.
72 Id.
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Finally, the Supreme Court again considered the broad pre-
emptive range of the ADA in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg.73 The
Court had “little difficulty rejecting” the argument that ADA
preemption only applies to laws enacted by state legislatures and
to state administrative agency regulations, and not to common
law developments.74 The ADA preempts state “‘law[s], regula-
tion[s], or other provision[s] having the force and effect of
law,’”75 and the Court noted that it is normal practice to refer to
common law developments as “provisions.”76 Further, the Court
noted that common law developments have “the force and ef-
fect of law” that the ADA prohibits.77 The Court elaborated,
pointing out that the central purpose of the ADA would not be
served by exempting common law rules or developments from
its purview.78 In the eyes of the Court, exempting common law
rules would provide the states with a way to undo the deregula-
tion intended by the ADA.79 The effect of exempting common
law rules from ADA preemption would therefore allow some
modicum of state regulation of prices, routes, and/or services,
rather than allowing the forces of the free market to dictate
prices, routes, and services.80 The Court recognized this, and
stated the importance of “the effect of a state law, regulation, or
provision, not its form[:] . . . [T]he ADA’s deregulatory aim can
be undermined just as surely by a state common-law rule as it
can by a state statute or regulation.”81
These three Supreme Court cases explored the broad scope
of ADA preemption.82 Are there any niches left unmapped? As
the next section discusses, states have tried to find where the
line is drawn in order to avoid preemption, yet still exert some
facet of control over the air ambulance industry.
C. ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE HAVE MIXED RESULTS
Lawmakers at both the state and federal level have attempted
to effectuate change in terms of state regulation of the air ambu-
73 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014).
74 See id. at 1429.
75 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).
76 Id.
77 Id.




82 See id. at 1428–29.
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lance industry. Unfortunately, these attempts have mostly been
met with precedent-deferential courts or a lack of information,
both leading to the same result: disallowance of state regulations
of the air ambulance industry, with one exception.83
1. State Level84
Several states have attempted to regulate the air ambulance
industry in some way, shape, or form, and seemingly each at-
tempt to regulate is met with resistance by the courts. While the
most common attempt comes via statutory enactment passed by
the state legislature, there are subtle nuances between the ap-
proaches, and some attempts eschew the legislature altogether
and come from the administrative side. Further, Montana has
passed a statute that does not seek to regulate the air ambulance
industry, but gives incentives for air ambulance providers to
make their services more affordable to Montana residents.85
a. North Dakota
North Dakota lawmakers passed a law that gave the North Da-
kota Department of Health the authority to create a “primary
call list” of air ambulance providers.86 The statute required that
for an air ambulance provider to qualify for inclusion on the
primary call list, the provider must become “a participating pro-
vider of the health insurance carriers in the state which collec-
tively hold at least seventy-five percent of the health insurance
coverage in the state as determined by annual market share re-
ports.”87 A participating provider agrees to charge only what is
allowed in the insurance contracts of the carriers the provider
joins, which would leave patients responsible only for deduct-
ibles and any copayments that their policies require.88
The statute also laid out a protocol for emergency medical
services personnel to follow when arranging for an air
ambulance:
83 See infra Part IV., Section C.1.f.
84 This discussion is not meant to be an exclusive or exhaustive list of every
state attempt at air ambulance regulation. There may be other states that have
attempted regulation, but the states included herein are the prominent
examples.
85 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320 (West 2015).
86 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-27-04.10(1) (West 2016).
87 § 23-27-04.10(2).
88 See Springer, supra note 1.
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(1) First, the recipient of the request shall call an air ambulance
service provider listed on the primary call list which is within the
designated response zone.
(2) Second, if each of the air ambulance service providers listed
on the primary list is not available or is not able and willing to
respond to the call, the recipient of the request shall notify the
requester of this fact and shall call an air ambulance provider
listed on the secondary call list within the designated response
zone.
(3) Third, if each of the air ambulance service providers listed on
the secondary list is not available or is not able and willing to
respond to the call, the recipient of the request shall notify the
requester of this fact and shall inform the requester of primary
and secondary air ambulance service provider options outside
the designated response zone.89
This protocol leads to medical personnel targeting participating
providers first, and means medical personnel can contact prov-
iders on the secondary list only when the entirety of the primary
list has turned down the call.90 The statute throws another wrin-
kle at air ambulance providers, as it instructs the Department of
Health to “establish air ambulance service response zones . . .
based on response times and patient health and safety.”91 Prov-
iders who are outside the response zone organized by the De-
partment of Health become the tertiary option.92
This protocol and the participating provider mandate
prompted Valley Med Flight, Inc. to file suit seeking to prevent
North Dakota from enforcing the statute.93 In North Dakota,
the carrier Blue Cross Blue Shield controls a majority of the
health insurance market.94 Therefore, in order to comply with
the North Dakota statute, an air ambulance provider wanting to
operate in North Dakota “must become a participating provider
with [Blue Cross Blue Shield] in order to be listed on the pri-
mary call list.”95 This meant that in order for Valley Med to get
on the primary call list, it had to agree with Blue Cross Blue





93 See Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934 (D.N.D. 2016).
94 See id. at 936 (“Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Dakota (“BCBS”) controls
more than 50% of the health insurance market in North Dakota.”).
95 Id.
96 See id. at 936–37.
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ment led to Valley Med accepting reimbursement rates with
Blue Cross Blue Shield that were “substantially below the market
rate,” so much so that it would be unable to continue operating
if it had to accept these rates.97
While North Dakota argued that providers make “a business
decision” when they choose to become participating providers,
the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
ruled that when that is the only choice other than discontinuing
operations, it is no choice at all.98 Participating providers on the
primary call list have a “competitive advantage” over providers
on the secondary call list.99 That competitive advantage means
that participating providers will receive more calls, while provid-
ers on the secondary list are only contacted when the entire pri-
mary list refuses the call. This severely restricts the ability of
providers to offer their services.100 The court held that North
Dakota interfered with the market participation of air ambu-
lance providers, which “is precisely the type of state regulation
Congress sought to prevent when it included an express pre-
emption clause in the ADA.”101
The District Court went even further, finding that the North
Dakota statute was preempted on pricing grounds as well.102
The court said that the North Dakota statute indirectly impacted
the prices charged by air ambulance providers by forcing them
to accept the reimbursement rates of carriers in order to be-
come participating providers.103 While the statute’s plain lan-
guage did not restrict the rates an air ambulance provider could
charge, Ginsberg instructed the court that the effect, rather than
the form, of a state law is what is important when analyzing
preemption.104
b. North Carolina
A North Carolina statute stated, “[n]o person shall offer or
develop a new institutional health service without first obtaining
97 Id. at 937.




102 See id. at 941–42.
103 See id. (“There can be little question Section 23-27-04.10 effects [sic] Valley
Med’s prices and thus relates to price under the ADA.”).
104 See id. at 941 (citing Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430
(2014)).
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a certificate of need from the Department . . . .”105 “New institu-
tional health service[ ]” is defined to include air ambulances.106
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that the purposes behind requiring a certif-
icate of need “directly contravene the pro-competition purposes
underlying the ADA.”107 The court held that because the North
Carolina statute prescribed behavior that was necessary for an
air ambulance provider to operate within the state, it was related
to price, route, or service under the ADA and thus pre-
empted.108 The statute substituted the commands of the govern-
ment for the market forces that justify the ADA.109
c. Wyoming
Wyoming Statute Section 27-14-401(e) dictated that “[i]f
transportation by ambulance is necessary, the division shall al-
low a reasonable charge for the ambulance service at a rate not
in excess of the rate schedule established by the director under
the procedure set forth for payment of medical and hospital
care.”110 The fee schedule adopted for air ambulance providers
set maximum allowable reimbursement rates.111 While air ambu-
lance providers would submit bills to the Worker’s Compensa-
tion Division in excess of the maximum rate allowed under the
fee schedule, the Division would only pay the amounts al-
lowed.112 Under the Wyoming statute, “ambulance services are
not considered ‘medical and hospital care,’” so air ambulance
providers are not allowed to balance bill injured workers who
use their services.113 This statutory limit restricts the amount that
air ambulance providers can receive in exchange for their ser-
105 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 131E-178(a) (West 2016) (effective July 5, 2007).
106 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 131E-176(16)(f1)(1) (West 2005) (effective to June
18, 2009) (note that this provision is still present in the current codification of
the statute).
107 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-401(e) (West 2016).
111 EagleMed, LLC v. Wyoming, No. 15-CV-26-ABJ, slip op. at 3 (D. Wy. May 16,
2016) (found at http://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2015-2016/
Economic-Affairs/Committee-Topics/Ambulance/WYwork-comp-court-case5-
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUZ8-NYJR]).
112 Id., slip op. at 3–4.
113 Id., slip op. at 25.
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vices, setting up a collision course with ADA preemption.114 The
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming found
that by restricting balance billing, the statute was dictating the
maximum rate that air ambulance providers operating within
Wyoming could charge for their services, and held that such
rate restrictions were preempted by the ADA.115
d. Minnesota
In Hiawatha Aviation of Rochester, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of
Health,116 the State Commissioner of the Department of Health
denied a provider’s application to operate an air ambulance ser-
vice in Minnesota. Based on a predecessor to the ADA, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota ruled that the state, and by
extension, the Commissioner of the Department of Health, was
“preempted from controlling entry into the field of air ambu-
lance service . . . .”117 However, the state supreme court also
noted that this ruling did not “oust the state from its traditional
role in the delivery of medical services-the [sic] regulation of
staffing requirements, the qualifications of personnel, equip-
ment requirements, and the promulgation of standards for
maintenance of sanitary conditions.”118
e. Florida
In Florida, following a fatal motorcycle accident, a plaintiff’s
estate sought declaratory judgment that the billing practices of
an air ambulance provider violated state statutes related to per-
sonal injury protection.119 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida held that there was only one way
to view the plaintiff’s claims: as challenging the rates of the air
ambulance provider for its services.120 The court said that al-
lowing the claims to proceed “would naturally affect the provi-
sion of [the provider’s] services in addition to the prices of and
114 Id., slip op. at 30 (“Because the air ambulances cannot collect above the
amount the defendants have set in their fee schedules, the statute and regula-
tions are directly related to air carrier prices.”).
115 Id., slip op. at 33.
116 389 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1986).
117 Id. at 509.
118 Id.
119 Bailey v. Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1378–79
(S.D. Fla. 2015).
120 See id. at 1382.
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payment for those services.”121 This led the court to view the
Plaintiff’s claims as an enforcement action under state law.122
Such actions are “expressly disallowed by the ADA’s express pre-
emption provision, which intentionally leaves the price of such
services to the competitive market.”123
f. Colorado
The Colorado example is different from the other state exam-
ples discussed above. Colorado’s statute required all air ambu-
lance providers be licensed to operate in the state, and that the
provider must complete an accreditation process by the commis-
sion on accreditation of medical transport systems.124 Eagle Air
Med Corporation, an air ambulance provider, filed suit alleging
that the Colorado statute was preempted by the ADA and seek-
ing a declaratory judgment.125 The defendants moved to stay the
action.126 The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado noted that the Supreme Court has previously said that
“only those state laws having a ‘significant effect’ or a ‘significant
impact’ on the prices, routes, or services, of an air carrier were
preempted under the ADA.”127 The Colorado court construed
the Morales language as indicating that the scope of ADA pre-
emption was narrower than the statute suggests.128 The Colo-
rado court held “that the ADA’s preclusion of state regulation of
carrier ‘price, route, or service’ [did not] conclusively equate[ ]
to state regulation” of air ambulances.129 Therefore, the court
declined to issue a declaratory judgment and granted the de-
fendants’ motion to stay the action.130 In other words, the Colo-
rado court found that ADA preclusion might not be as broad as
the Supreme Court suggested in Morales, and since the Colorado
statute did not outright have a significant effect or impact on




124 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3.5-307(1)(a) (West 2007) (effective to May 31,
2016).
125 Eagle Air Med Corp. v. Colorado Bd. of Health, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1290
(D. Colo. 2008).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1292 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388,
390 (1992)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1293.
130 Id. at 1295.
2017] COMMENT 449
ration, the ADA did not clearly preempt the Colorado statute at
the time of the filing.131 Since Eagle Air Med Corp. v. Colorado
Board of Health, the Colorado legislature has subsequently
amended Section 25-3.5-307.132 The current statute simplifies
the accreditation language, removing the commission on ac-
creditation of medical transport systems language, and adding
generic references to a department-approved accrediting organ-
ization and compliance with rules set by the board.133
g. Montana
Seeing “a need to assist Montana consumers with regard to
the availability and affordability of air ambulance service[s],”134
the Montana Legislature passed a law exempting air ambulance
providers from insurance statutes.135 Unlike some of the legisla-
tion passed by other states discussed in this section, Montana’s
statute does not attempt to regulate the air ambulance industry,
but rather seeks to entice air ambulance providers to create
membership programs that will make air ambulance services
more affordable.136 A concern137 with air ambulance member-
ship programs is, as Mr. Lovshin states: “You are covered only if
that company is the one to transport you. . . . If a different com-
pany (of the 14 currently operating in Montana) provides the
service, you have no coverage.”138 However, Mr. Lovshin is incor-
rect, at least in terms of the Montana statute. Section 50-6-
320(3) of the Montana Health and Safety Code states: “Any pri-
vate air ambulance service membership program must have ar-
rangements with other air ambulance service providers in
Montana to the extent reasonably possible to ensure maximum
geographic coverage within the state for the subscribers to the
131 Id. at 1292–93 (“There remains at least a question whether the subject Colo-
rado statute and regulations, which specifically relate only to emergency medical
air transport, frustrate these objectives or any other objective of the ADA. This
certainly must be taken into account in determining whether it is ‘facially conclu-
sive’ that Colorado’s statute and regulations are preempted by 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)(1).”).
132 See 2016 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 206 (H.B. 16-1280) (West).
133 See id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3.5-307(1)(a)(West 2016).
134 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(1) (West 2015).
135 See id.; Lovshin, supra note 17, at 32.
136 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(2) (West 2015).
137 For a detailed discussion of membership program concerns and how they
work, see infra Part V., Section B.3.
138 Lovshin, supra note 17.
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program.”139 Unlike what Mr. Lovshin contends, a subscriber is
not covered only when the provider he or she subscribes to is
the one to transport the subscriber. Section 50-6-320(3) actually
requires air ambulance providers who take advantage of the ex-
emption to work with other air ambulance providers to ensure
their programs are transferrable amongst providers for the ben-
efit of subscribers.140 While not necessarily immune to potential
legal challenges, this Montana statute appears to present a tem-
plate that other states may be able to use to assist their citizens
in making air ambulance services more affordable.141
2. Federal Level
State governments are not the only legislative bodies making
efforts to regulate the air ambulance industry; there are some
members of Congress who have recognized the importance of
the issue and have made an effort to attempt to return some
power back to the states. Coincidentally (or maybe not so), the
two senators at the forefront of the congressional effort are from
states that have already attempted to pass their own legislation
regulating the air ambulance industry: Senator Jon Tester from
Montana142 and Senator John Hoeven from North Dakota.143
Senator Tester and Senator Hoeven became the first members
of Congress to attempt to reclaim air ambulance regulation for
the states when they introduced Senate Amendment 3753.144
Amendment 3753, titled “State Prioritization of Dispatch of
Air Ambulance Service Providers,” sought to grant states the
power to pass legislation “that creates a primary and secondary
call list of air ambulance service providers in the State for distri-
bution to emergency response entities and personnel to priori-
tize the dispatch of air ambulance serve [sic] providers,”
notwithstanding the ADA.145 On April 13, 2016, Senators Tester
and Hoeven introduced this proposed amendment less than a
month after the United States District Court for the District of
139 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(3) (West 2015).
140 See id.
141 See infra Part V., Section B.3.
142 See Biography, JON TESTER, U.S. SENATOR FOR MONTANA, http://www.tester.
senate.gov/?p=biography [https://perma.cc/SG24-GNXQ] (last visited July 6,
2017).
143 See Biography, U.S. SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN OF NORTH DAKOTA, https://www.
hoeven.senate.gov/about/biography [https://perma.cc/X4UH-BTWW] (last vis-
ited July 6, 2017).
144 See S. Amdt. 3753, 162 CONG. REC. S2048 (Apr. 13, 2016).
145 Id.
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North Dakota issued its ruling in Valley Med Flight, Inc. v.
Dwelle.146 As one of the senators from North Dakota,147 Senator
Hoeven was surely aware of the United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota’s decision, which may explain the
similarities in language shared by Amendment 3753 and the
North Dakota statute.148 Unfortunately, Amendment 3753 “was
ordered to lie on the table,”149 meaning that the Senate wished
to take a negative position on the amendment and wanted to
express its final action on it.150
However, Senator Tester continued working for a way to give
more power in the air ambulance arena back to the states. He
cleared a huge obstacle on June 9, 2016, when the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee submitted a report (accompanying the
2017 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appro-
priations Bill) that included language directing the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to study “air ambulance services
and payment structures.”151 While the Senate Appropriations
Committee report itself does not immediately give states the
power to regulate the air ambulance industry within their bor-
ders, Senator Tester stressed that this small victory was “a ‘giant’
step in the right direction.”152 Senator Tester elaborated on how
Congress and states could use the results from the report, saying
“[w]e don’t have a lot of information on this quite frankly, and
this will give us some information so that we can talk to the air
ambulance services and potentially develop some rules around
these air ambulances.”153 Having been approved by the Senate
Appropriations Committee, the 2017 Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education Appropriations Bill was placed on the
146 See id.; Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930 (D.N.D. 2016)
(“Signed March 21, 2016”).
147 See Biography, U.S. SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN OF NORTH DAKOTA, supra note
143.
148 Compare S. Amdt. 3753, with N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-27-04.10 (West
2016).
149 S. Amdt. 3753, 162 CONG. REC. S2048 (Apr. 13, 2016).
150 Enactment of a Law: Motions, Quorums, and Votes, U.S. SENATE, https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Enactment_law.htm#6 [https://
perma.cc/F5RS-NMCV] (last visited July 6, 2017).
151 S. REP. NO. 114-274, at 128 (2016).
152 Angela Marshall, Air Ambulance Reform Effort Passes U.S. Senate Committee,
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Senate Legislative Calendar on June 9, 2016.154 Once the GAO
submits its report, members of Congress will have more informa-
tion that highlights the importance of this issue. Senator Tes-
ter’s Communication Director Marnee Banks emphasized the
need for more information when discussing Senator Tester’s
and Senator Hoeven’s earlier failed effort: “ ‘This is the first time
the Senate has tackled the issue of these outrageously high
prices of air ambulances. So it is going to take a while for [Sena-
tor Tester] and Senator Hoeven to educate their colleagues on
[its] importance . . . .’”155 With more than 550,000 patients us-
ing air ambulances each year,156 education is sorely needed, and
will ideally lead to congressional action in the near future.
V. WHY SHOULD AIR AMBULANCES FALL OUTSIDE
THE ADA?
A person in the middle of a medical emergency requiring air
transport for treatment does not have the luxury of making sure
that the transporting air ambulance is a provider covered by the
patient’s insurance, nor does the patient have the luxury of even
inquiring as to the price of using such a service.157 To account
for this problem, this article argues that Congress must exempt
air ambulances from the purview of ADA preemption because of
conflicting congressional intent, because Supreme Court prece-
dent has all but handcuffed the courts, and because of the se-
vere inequality of power that exists in the air ambulance
provider-patient relationship.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
When interpreting express preemption clauses, the “task is to
ascertain Congress’ intent in enacting the federal statute at is-
sue.”158 The United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota in Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle said that legisla-
tion intending “to prevent air ambulance service providers . . .
from imposing exorbitant fees on patients . . . is precisely the
154 Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.
gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+or+Fiscal+Year+2017 [https://
perma.cc/4QRS-AF74] (last visited July 7, 2017).
155 Corin Cates-Carney, Air Ambulance Reform Effort Dies in US Senate, MONTANA
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 15, 2016), http://mtpr.org/post/air-ambulance-reform-ef
fort-dies-us-senate [https://perma.cc/K79X-X6LR].
156 See Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20.
157 See Jordon, supra note 38.
158 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
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type of law Congress sought to preempt when it enacted the
ADA.”159 While Congress has demonstrated its intent “to rest
sole responsibility for supervising the aviation industry with the
federal government,”160 Congress surely did not intend to allow
providers to charge exorbitant fees on patients concerned about
their health. Many of the courts rely on the argument that state
statutes regulating the air ambulance industry are the exact type
of laws that Congress meant to preempt when it enacted the
ADA.161 However, would Congress really intend for medical pa-
tients to be taken advantage of just to get treatment that could
save their lives? While there is evidence to suggest that Congress
did not intend for the ADA to preempt safety measures,162 the
ADA makes it clear that Congress did intend to preempt pricing
regulations imposed by states.163 The point where one draws the
line between price and safety is unclear. Equally unclear is
whether the law views one as being out-and-out more important
than the other, or whether the two are to be treated equally,
notwithstanding any arguments of morality.
An analysis of the legislative intent behind the ADA sheds
light on Congress’ true goals when passing the ADA.164 When
examining legislative or “statutory intent,” the starting point is
“the language employed by Congress and the assumption that
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”165 The policy statement contained in 42
U.S.C. § 40101 confirms that Congress felt “assigning and main-
taining safety [was] the highest priority” and that Congress is
committed to “preventing deterioration in established safety
procedures . . . .”166 Further, Congress noted that its “clear in-
tent, encouragement, and dedication [is] to further the highest
degree of safety in air transportation . . . .”167 As air ambulances
are a medical service,168 surely the air ambulance industry would
fall under the safety umbrella.
159 Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D. 2016).
160 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1999).
161 See, e.g., Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942; Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F.
Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
162 See Resendiz, supra note 16, at 343–44.
163 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012).
164 See Resendiz, supra note 16, at 343.
165 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
166 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(1), (a)(3) (2012).
167 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(3) (2012).
168 See supra Part II.
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However, the plain language of the ADA makes it clear that
Congress meant to preempt state regulation of prices charged
by air ambulance providers.169 Thus, an inevitable conflict exists
between whether state air ambulance regulations control mea-
sures governing the safety of patients or whether they control
prices. The answer, in reality, appears to be that under the ADA,
state air ambulance regulations can control either measures as-
sociated with patient safety or prices. Clearly, the courts have
taken the position that the state regulations discussed herein
lean toward the pricing side of the conflict.170 On the other
hand, there are instances holding that some issues are not pre-
empted, therefore allowing the states to regulate some air ambu-
lance issues. Those issues revolve largely around aspects related
to the quality and standard of medical care given to patients.171
While these findings do not provide a conclusive answer to the
question, because of this dichotomy it appears state regulation
must relate to standards of medical care in some capacity if they
are to survive ADA preemption challenge.
Preemption is no longer the best option because competition
does not effectively serve emergency medical situations. Con-
gress enacted the ADA after determining “that deregulation of
the airline industry would lead to greater reliance on market
forces resulting in greater efficiency, innovation, lower prices,
and enhanced quality and variety of air transportation ser-
vices.”172 Congress thought this “reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition” would best
serve the aircraft industry.173 Congress even included a preemp-
tion provision in the ADA to prevent states from getting around
deregulation by passing their own regulatory laws.174 However,
Congress was also clear in the difference between safety and
169 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012); see also Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle,
171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D. 2016).
170 See, e.g., Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942; Eagle Air Med Corp. v. Colorado Bd.
of Health, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1292 (D. Colo. 2008) (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at
388, 390–91).
171 See Hiawatha Aviation of Rochester, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep’t of Health, 389
N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. 1986); GAO-10-907, at 23 tbl.3, 36–40 app. III (2010)
(reproduced infra Appendix); Lovshin, supra note 17, at 34 (“states do have lim-
ited regulatory authority over air ambulance providers around medical and qual-
ity standards of care”).
172 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 378).
173 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2012).
174 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
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pricing regulations.175 Clearly Congress believed that a competi-
tive market would lead to lower prices, but it is doubtful that
Congress would really intend for competition to govern the safe,
timely, and effective administration of healthcare in emergency
situations.
However, competition won out against healthcare services in
Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, where the court found that North Car-
olina’s prescription of behavior (requiring a certificate of need)
necessary for an air ambulance provider to operate in the state
directly contravened the pro-competition purposes of the ADA,
and those requirements limiting the ability of an air ambulance
provider to operate in the state were thus related to the pro-
vider’s prices, routes, or services.176 Additionally, in Valley Med
Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, the court actually ruled in favor of a result
that was the direct opposite of what Congress intended.177 By
holding that the North Dakota statute was preempted, the court
essentially said that the state could not “prevent air ambulance
service providers, who are not participating providers, from im-
posing exorbitant fees on patients.”178 That flies directly in the
face of Congress’ intent in enacting the ADA: that a competitive
market would lead to lower prices.179
B. PATIENTS REMAIN AT THE MERCY OF PROVIDERS DUE TO
UNEQUAL BALANCE OF POWER
Air ambulance providers control virtually every aspect of air
ambulance services, and oddly enough, the patient has little to
no control. From setting the price, to working with different in-
surance carriers, the air ambulance providers are in near-total
control. The patient is simply along for the ride. The following
subsections will discuss the costs of air ambulance services, the
complications that come with in-network versus out-of-network
providers, and a possible template for state action based on the
Montana statute.180
175 See supra Part V., Section A.
176 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
177 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942.
178 Id.
179 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
180 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320 (West 2015) (discussed in Part IV., Section
C.1.g.).
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1. Costs of Services
Use of an air ambulance can be an expensive event. The aver-
age air ambulance trip will cost $12,000 to $25,000 per flight,
before insurance kicks in.181 Providers justify the costly charges
by citing the cost of equipment,182 maintenance, their round-
the-clock on-call flight and medical personnel, and the intrinsic
value of the air ambulance service.183 When setting prices, prov-
iders must estimate the volume of patient transports and how
many of those transports will and will not end up paying for the
service.184 Some air ambulance providers recognize the costs of
their services, and offer programs designed to help would-be pa-
tients in the future. For example, LifeNet, for an annual fee of
just $49, will pay $10,000 if a subscriber’s family member has a
medical necessity that requires transportation by air ambu-
lance.185 Some air ambulance providers have also created mem-
bership-based subscription programs that will cover transport
between hospitals186 or that can cover the patient’s full cost
when that patient needs an air ambulance.187 However, mem-
bership programs come with a large caveat: generally, to take
advantage of the benefits offered by a membership subscription,
the provider that offers the membership must be the air ambu-
lance that transports the patient.188 Unfortunately, patients
often do not have any input or choice in the air ambulance pro-
vider that responds when they require transport.189
2. Choice of Provider: In-Network vs. Out-of-Network Providers
When an air ambulance provider is part of an insurance car-
rier’s network (in-network), the provider accepts the reimburse-
ment rate of the insurance carrier, and any additional cost to
the patient is written off.190 In contrast, an out-of-network pro-
vider may accept the reimbursement rate of the insurance car-
181 See DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Information Sheet, supra note 26; see also
Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20.
182 See DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Information Sheet, supra note 26 (“The
high price accounts for the initial aircraft cost which can reach $6 million . . . .”).
183 See Lovshin, supra note 17.
184 See Bernard F. Diederich, Air Ambulance, Rescuer or Rescuee?, 62 FED. LAW. 67,
71 (2015).
185 See Jordon, supra note 38.
186 See id.
187 See GAO-10-907, at 6 n.7.
188 See id.
189 See infra Part V, Section B.2.
190 See Jordon, supra note 38.
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rier, but has the option to balance bill191 the patient for the
remainder of the cost.192 However, patients rarely are aware
whether the air ambulance that responds is in-network or out-of-
network.193 Even worse, in emergency situations, patients may
not even be capable of asking if the ambulance is an in-network
provider, or what their insurance coverage looks like.194 Douglas
County’s Chief Deputy Sheriff Tom Wheeler said: “ ‘A lot of
times the person is unconscious or there’s trauma or shock.
We’re not asking them what to do. We’re providing the best re-
sponse we can, and you’ve got to make decisions right now.’”195
The patient is typically not even the party that requests an air
ambulance; that determination falls to the paramedics on the
scene, and scope of insurance coverage is a non-factor in that
decision.196 Even the providers do not consider whether they are
in or out of a patient’s coverage network; such is the case with
emergency situations, where every second counts.197
3. A Possible Template for State Action
States looking to “assist [their] consumers with regard to the
availability and affordability of air ambulance service” may be
able to take a cue from the Montana statute.198 As an incentiviz-
ing measure, rather than a regulatory one, statutes similar to the
Montana statute may be better equipped to survive ADA chal-
lenge. Air ambulance providers would actually be making “a
business decision” when they choose to take advantage of
whatever exemptions or benefits the state chooses to offer in
exchange for compliance with the statute (in the Montana stat-
ute, the state exempted providers from insurance statutes),199
and would not be forced into working with other providers in
order to continue operating. This would overcome the point
191 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
192 See Jordon, supra note 38.
193 See Springer, supra note 1.
194 Kathleen Woodford, Air Ambulance Charges Can Reach $100,000, CLARK FORK
VALLEY PRESS (May 4, 2016), https://www.tester.senate.gov/?p=news&id=4566
[https://perma.cc/E68W-49ZJ].
195 See Jordon, supra note 38.
196 See id.
197 See id. (“In emergencies, ‘we never even ask . . . . We just respond. Insur-
ance never comes to our thoughts at that time. Hopefully they have insurance,
and if they don’t, we work with them on a case-by-case basis.’”).
198 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(1) (West 2015); see discussion supra Part IV.,
Section C.1.g.
199 See § 50-6-320(2).
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made by the court in Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle.200 Providers
would only have to work with other providers and accept mem-
bership programs offered by other providers if they wanted to
be exempted from insurance statutes: “Any private air ambu-
lance service membership program must have arrangements
with other air ambulance service providers in [the state] to the
extent reasonably possible to ensure maximum geographic cov-
erage within the state for the subscribers to the program.”201 If
the provider does not wish to work with other providers, they
can carry on with business as usual, and will not be in danger of
having to cease operations as a result.202
Subscription-based membership programs do not escape the
problems facing the air ambulance industry, nor are they a per-
fect solution. For patients to benefit from these programs, gen-
erally the transporting provider must be the same one that
offers the membership subscription.203 But, since patients have
little say in what provider picks them up,204 they cannot be sure
that their subscription will cover their use of the air ambulance.
The Montana statute solves this conundrum. To take advantage
of the benefits that accompany exemption from insurance stat-
utes, providers must arrange with other air ambulance providers
to reasonably “ensure maximum geographic coverage within the
state for the subscribers to the program.”205 More providers ac-
cepting the subscriptions offered by rival providers would no-
ticeably increase the likelihood that a responding air ambulance
provider would accept the membership subscription of a pa-
tient. This would avoid patients having to worry about whether it
will be their subscribing provider that responds, and would also
keep patients from sacrificing valuable time waiting for their
subscribing provider to be available to respond. While it would
be imprudent to suggest that every air ambulance provider
within a state would avail themselves of the benefits offered by
200 See Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (D.N.D.
2016) (“The State argues that becoming a ‘participating provider’ is simply a
business decision made by air ambulance operators. However, it is clear to the
Court that air ambulance operators who work in the North Dakota market have
no choice but to become a ‘participating provider’ (and accept an insurer’s
rates) or discontinue operating in the state.”).
201 § 50-6-320(3).
202 See §§ 50-6-320(2), (3).
203 See GAO-10-907, at 6 n.7.
204 See supra Part V., Section B.2.
205 § 50-6-320(3).
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such a statute, one might presume that some air ambulance
providers would explore the opportunity.
This approach does not solve the overall issue, but is a step in
a more affordable direction. While consumers would have to
purchase membership subscriptions in order to benefit, if stat-
utes like this were to become more commonplace, that small
investment could mean a difference of multiple thousands of
dollars in the event an air ambulance is needed.206 It is impor-
tant to note that the Montana statute has yet to be challenged
on ADA preemption grounds, but as it is merely incentivizing,
not prescriptive, there is reason to believe that it would survive
such a challenge.
C. PRECEDENT LEAVES NO OTHER OPTION
Decisions by the Supreme Court and lower courts appear to
have halted efforts by state legislators in their tracks.207 Further,
despite the intentions of Congress, it is increasingly clear that
the courts are handcuffed on the inevitable conflict created by
this issue.208
Chandler v. Roudebush209 seems to support the argument that
the federal courts should take up the air ambulance industry
preemption issue. The Court noted that issues that “require[ ]
non-partisan judgment” are best heard by federal judges.210 This
is because federal jurists are, in theory, shielded from outside
influence.211 Given the unequal balance of power that exists be-
tween patients and providers, the air ambulance industry pre-
emption issue clearly would benefit from non-partisan
judgment.212 As numerous federal courts have already addressed
the issue, that leaves the Supreme Court as the best judicial op-
tion. The Court should be able to remove politics from the
206 Compare GAO-10-907, at 6 n.7, with DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Infor-
mation Sheet, supra note 26 (“The average air ambulance trip . . . costs between
$12,000 to $25,000 per flight.”).
207 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F.
Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D. 2016).
208 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942 (“While the policy choices the State is
attempting to impose . . . are well-intentioned and enacted in good faith, it is
clear that Congress has assumed the field in the arena of air carrier regulation
and noble intent does not save the law from preemption.”).
209 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
210 Id. at 851 (internal quotations omitted).
211 See id.
212 See supra Part V., Section B.
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formula completely, as the life tenure enjoyed by Supreme
Court justices would, theoretically at least, make the Court
“more likely to withstand political pressures and render their de-
cisions in a climate tempered by judicial reflection and sup-
ported by historical judicial independence.”213
Indeed, the Supreme Court has addressed the preemption is-
sue. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the Court held that the
ADA preempted prescriptive, conduct-controlling laws.214 The
problem facing states post-Wolens is figuring out how they can
regulate the air ambulance industry without controlling air am-
bulance providers’ conduct. That problem is multiplied when
reminded of the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. that the ADA’s broad preemptive pur-
pose stems from the “relating to” language.215 It would appear to
be a difficult road for state lawmakers to pass legislation that
could survive scrutiny under both Morales and Wolens.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court ex-
pressed the idea that there would be general discretion to the
legislature as to the laws that are passed, in the assumption that
they “rest[ ] upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.”216 The Court also suggested, in
the famous footnote that has come to be known as “the most
important footnote in constitutional law,”217 that the judicial sys-
tem can step in to prevent the legislative exploitation of those in
weaker or less powerful positions, especially when there “may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
. . . .”218 In the case of the air ambulance industry, there is such a
special condition: federal courts repeatedly holding that state
regulation of the air ambulance industry is preempted by the
ADA,219 as well as the holdings in Morales220 and Wolens.221 The
holdings in these cases have effectively shut off the ability of
213 Chandler, 425 U.S. at 851 (internal quotations omitted).
214 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1995).
215 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
216 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
217 Lincoln Caplan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Footnote Four, THE NEW YORKER,
Sept. 13, 2013.
218 See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
219 See, e.g., Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D.
2016); Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
220 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.
221 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1995).
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state lawmakers to pass legislation regulating the air ambulance
industry that will protect their citizens.
However, the courts have about as much likelihood of success-
fully ruling in favor of state regulation as state lawmakers do, as
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg suggests that the ADA preempts state
common law developed by the courts.222 While the Supreme
Court could still easily address the issue by nature of its chief
status, doing so would fly in the face of years of precedent be-
cause it would directly oppose Ginsberg. Further, while the Su-
preme Court is a possible option to resolve this issue, there is a
temporal component to the issue as well: it can take years before
a case is adjudicated by the Supreme Court. That rules out wait-
ing on the Supreme Court as the best option, as countless pa-
tients will suffer in the meantime.223 By process of elimination,
responsibility for regulating the air ambulance industry falls to
the United States Congress. In the wake of EagleMed, LLC v. Wyo-
ming, the Wyoming Insurance Commissioner, Tom Glause, even
went so far as to opine that “Congress needs to exempt the air
ambulances from the Aviation Deregulation Act. ‘Once that
happens, then the states can take a look at it and address legisla-
tion to deal with the issue . . . .’”224
VI. CONCLUSION
In times of serious medical crisis, patients depend on emer-
gency services personnel to arrive quickly and transport them so
that they may receive life-saving treatment. The air ambulance
industry has grown a great deal since its beginnings on the bat-
tlefields of World War I, and advances in technology have
helped develop the industry. However, because of legal prece-
dent and air ambulance industry norms, medical patients are
the ones who suffer under the ADA. Maintaining that technol-
ogy and staffing air ambulances is expensive, and without regu-
lation, the patient is left to figure out how to pay an expensive
bill while recovering from the injuries he sustained. The legal
framework of the ADA has left the courts handcuffed, forcing
222 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1429–30 (2014).
223 See Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20
(“The Association of Air Medical Services estimates that more than 550,000 pa-
tients in the U.S. use air ambulances each year.”).
224 Ben Neary, Federal Judge Rejects Wyoming Air Ambulance Regulation, WASH.
TIMES (May 25, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/25/
federal-judge-rejects-wyoming-air-ambulance-regula/ [https://perma.cc/PPG2-
SMA2].
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them to find state attempts at regulation to be preempted by the
ADA, no matter the intent behind the regulatory legislation.
The best solution is for Congress to exempt air ambulances
from ADA preemption. Congressional intent shows that safety
and aspects of medical care are not meant to be preempted.
The cost of an air ambulance transport is as much a part of med-
ical care as the surgery that follows transportation. The fact that
the ambulance is a helicopter or a plane rather than a ground
vehicle should not be a determining factor, especially when an
air ambulance is the only available method of transport. Compe-
tition governs in a business setting, but in a life and death
healthcare situation, patients need the best available options,
not unpaid bills.
